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31. Introduction
The distinction and relationship between production functions for individual firms and the aggregate
production function for an industry have long been recognised. Johansen (1972) still stands out as one
of the most elaborate and rigorous studies of how these concepts should be interpreted. This study
built on the insight provided by Houthakker (1955-56), Johansen (1959) and Salter (1960)1, which
recognised and focused on two fundamental points. First, firms even within narrowly defined
industries, differ with respect to size, performance and productivity. This observation would neither
be sensational nor challenging if such inter-firm differences were modest and temporary. However,
there has long been strong empirical evidence that such differences are both substantial and persistent.
Recent research on micro data has strengthened this conclusion, see for example Sutton (1997), Baily,
Hulten and Campbell (1992), Klette (1994), Klette and Mathiassen (1995, 1996). Second,
relationships between aggregate output and inputs reflect economic equilibrium adjustments as well
as properties of the micro production functions. Aggregate industry variables will be weighted sums
of the corresponding micro variables. More concretely, aggregate factor productivities are by
definition output weighted averages of the productivity in the individual firms. Obviously, the
autonomy, and thereby the value of such average concepts as «deep» structural parameters in
aggregate analyses, deteriorates when the weights in the average are likely to be sensitive to shifts in
different variables. The more inter-firm variation in productivity and endogenous variation of the
relative firm size, the more serious are the violations of the conditions for exact aggregation, and the
less is the adequacy and relevance of the notion of the «representative firm».
Despite massive empirical evidence of technology heterogeneity and the theoretical contributions
pointing out the need for replacing the representative firm by a more sophisticated model of aggregate
producer behaviour, cost heterogeneity has typically been ruled out by assumption in popular models
of aggregate industry behaviour. On the other hand, the role of product differentiation has been given
considerable attention, especially in the new literature of international trade and economic growth.
One of the most popular analytical tools in these fields of research is the model of the Large Group
case of Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition (LGMC), see e.g. Helpman and Krugman (1985)
and Helpman and Grossman (1992). However, this literature generally assumes that all firms have the
same production function, even if the seminal work of Chamberlin (1933) and Stigler (1949) argued
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 Also in Marshall’s theory of value, as laid out in Frisch (1950), the argument for assuming decreasing returns to scale at the
aggregate industry level relies on the existence of productivity differentials between firms combined with a selection
mechanism, which ensures that only profitable firms are active.
4that product differentiation is unlikely to exist without non-uniform costs. One exception from this
tradition is Montagna (1995).
The present paper contributes to clarify how aggregate industry productivity depends both on
productivity of individual firms, and on the market structure determining equilibrium output of firms.
The very presence of productivity differentials between firms in the model, allows us to study the
aggregate effects of technical change through catching up, i.e. reduction of the productivity gaps
between firms. We compare these effects with those resulting from uniform productivity shifts in all
firms. The market structure influences the aggregate productivity effect of the shifts by determining
the changes in equilibrium firm outputs, and thereby the weights in the relevant weights in the average
productivity calculation. We consider a model where firms have access to two segmented markets
differing in competitiveness. This enables us to identify the aggregate productivity effect of
endogenous adjustments of the allocation of output between different markets. In this respect we
distinguish what we refer to as a perfectly competitive export market from a monopolistically
competitive domestic market. In the export market all firms face a perfectly elastic demand function
represented by an exogenous world price. Domestic consumers are, on the other hand, assumed to
recognise products from different firms as imperfect substitutes, and the equilibrium in the domestic
product markets is described according to the LGMC model. However, our version of the LGMC
model becomes asymmetric due to productivity differentials among firms. A by-product of our study
of the transmission mechanism of firm-specific productivity shifts into equilibrium changes in
aggregate productivity is that we demonstrate a formal specification of productivity heterogeneity in
the LGMC framework, that does not make the model intractable with respect to closed form analytical
results.
By considering markets where both demand and supply simultaneously determine equilibrium prices
and quantities, our approach differs drastically from the one taken in Houthakker (1955-56) and
Johansen (1972). The latter studies presume that firms have different Leontief micro production
functions up to an exogenous capacity level. Thus, profitable firms will produce at their exogenous
capacity level and non-profitable firms will not produce at all. In this model, the endogeneity of
aggregate productivity is due to the endogeneity of which firms that will be profitable. Prices of both
factors and products are exogenous, giving no role for the demand side to play in the determination of
profits. Our model framework has much more in common with Montagna (1995), but differs by
imposing more structure on the inter-firm productivity differentials, yielding a return in terms of
5analytical tractability. However, our focus on aggregate productivity differs from the issues analysed
by Montagna.
The main results of the paper can be summarised as follows: Uniform productivity shifts are found to
affect aggregate productivity in a way fundamentally different from productivity shifts through
catching up. The change in aggregate productivity due to technology shocks at the level of the firm is
substantially affected by endogenous equilibrium adjustments. The deviation of aggregate
productivity from the productivity of the most efficient firm is confined to an interval whose width is
determined by the substitutability of the products of the firms in the industry. The equilibrium
adjustments may also cause aggregate productivity to be inversely related to productivity at the firm
level.
Especially transparent results are obtained by analysing an approximate solution, where we neglect
that the entry-exit condition causes the set active firms to be finite. A closer examination of the
accuracy of this approximation shows that it will be very high if one accepts the standard assumptions
underlying the LGMC case.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the partial equilibrium model of the industry.
Section 3 derives comparative statics results for both a uniform shift in firms’ productivities and
catching up through a reduction of the productivity gaps between firms. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model of a heterogeneous industry
2.1. The general model
The model is designed to capture the fact that most firms sell to several markets in which they have
different degrees of market power. In applied models, the most important distinction is typically made
between the export market and the domestic market. Empirical studies of firm data suggest that the
export share of output is positively correlated with productivity, cf. the survey of Bartelsman and
Doms (1997). In order to capture these patterns, we assume the export and the domestic markets to be
segmented from each other. Moreover, we assume that variable costs of export deliveries are
additively separable from variable costs of domestic deliveries. In each of the n active firms in the
industry, the total cost function takes the form
6(1) ( ) ( )C c X X Fi i iW s iH s= +  +1 1
where i∈ [0,n], Ci is total costs in firm no. i. X XiH iW and  are deliveries to the domestic and the
export market respectively, 0 1< ≤s  is the scale elasticity, ci is the inverse of a productivity parameter
specific to firm i, and F is fixed costs, associated with e.g. product development. The variable cost
function is assumed to take the same convex form for both kinds of deliveries. The gain form this
restrictive assumption is a simple representation of two phenomena that we want to capture: (i) The
possibility of decreasing returns to scale at the level of the firm, and (ii) that specialising in deliveries
to a single market may be costly. Appendix A shows how (1) can be derived from explicit
assumptions about the underlying production function.
Whereas the fixed cost element is assumed to be identical for all firms, productivity differentials
cause variable costs to differ between firms. We rank firms according to productivity, so that firm 0 is
the most efficient firm2. Productivity heterogeneity is formalised in a simple way by assuming the
relative productivity differentials between any two adjacent firms to be constant. For analytical
convenience, the set of firms and varieties is treated as a continuum. We also ignore the problem that i
should be an integer:
(2) dc
di
tc c cei i i
ti
= ⇔ = , t>0,
where (-t) is proportional to the relative productivity differential between firms3. c c0 = is exogenous.
The reward for restricting productivity heterogeneity to be represented by an exponential structure is a
tractable model of aggregate behaviour. As will be shown in the following, equilibrium solutions for
all variables associated with the heterogeneous firms turn out to be related by exponential functions of
i. This makes it straightforward to carry out the relevant integrals defining the corresponding
aggregate variables4.
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 As will be evident from the subsequent analysis, the relevant variable for ranking firms is profits. However, in this model
profits are an increasing function of productivity, so this is a point of no practical significance.
3
 More precisely, the variable cost function is derived from a production function of the form X = aVs , where a is the
productivity parameter and V is a variable input. When the productivity differentials take the exponential form  a ai i= γ , it
follows that t= -γ/s.
4
 In this respect, our approach has much in common to the derivation of aggregates in the perpetual youth overlapping
generation model used by Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965). In the perpetual youth model, the assumption that the
probability of dying is constant, independent of age, implies an exponential structure between the variables associated with
each cohort. This is the key to the tractability of the aggregate model.
7The model makes it possible to study two kinds of productivity shifts: Catching up can be represented
by a decrease in the productivity differentials, t, whereas a uniform improvement of the productivity
of all firms may be represented by a decline in c.
As noted above, the rationale for specifying two markets is that the market structure is important for
how productivity shifts at the level of the firm are transmitted to aggregate productivity. In the foreign
market, we assume that the price is exogenous and identical for all firms. On the other hand, producer
behaviour in the domestic market is characterised by monopolistic price setting. The difference in
market power between the two markets is consistent with several empirical studies, see e.g. Aukrust
(1970) and Bowitz and Cappelen (1994) for studies on Norwegian data. In the domestic market,
consumers consider the products of the n firms in the industry to be imperfect substitutes. Still,
products supplied by different firms within the industry have so much in common that they constitute
a separable differentiated good in the demand structure. Consumer preferences over the products
belonging to the differentiated good are assumed to take the symmetric CES-form, usually referred to
as Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. Equilibrium in the domestic market for each variety then
implies:
(3) X P
P
APi
H i
H
=




−
−
σ
ε
,
where Pi
H
 is the price of domestic deliveries of variety i , P is the consumer price index in the home
country for this composite industry good, σ>1 is the elasticity of substitution between the varieties
constituting the differentiated product, -ε is the own price elasticity of the composite good, and A is a
constant. We assume that σ>ε . The price index, P, consistent with the CES subutility function,
becomes:
(4) ( ) ( )P P diiHn= ∫ −
−1
0
1 1σ σ
Firms maximise profits, defined by
8(5) ( ) ( )π i iH iH i iH s W iW i iW sP X c X P X c X F= − + − −1 1
with respect to P Xi
H
i
W
 and  , subject to the common exogenous world price level and the perceived
demand schedule in the home market. The own price elasticity of perceived demand equals -σ for all
firms, since each firm neglects the influence of its own price on the price index. Because of the
separability of variable costs, the profit maximisation problem is separable. Operating profits from
domestic sales, ( )π iH iH iH i iH sP X c X= − 1 , is maximised with respect to PiH  subject to the perceived
demand elasticity in the domestic market. Operating profits from exports, ( )π iW W iW i iW sP X c X= − 1 is
maximised with respect to XiW .
The optimal price setting in the domestic market follows the familiar mark-up rule
(6) ( )P m c
s
Xi
H i
i
H
=
λ
,
where ( )m = −σ σ 1  is the mark-up factor and λ = −1 1s is the elasticity of marginal costs with
respect to output. Note that in the present asymmetric model, the positive bias of the perceived price
elasticity compared to the true elasticity differs between firms. The combination of cost differentials
and mark-up pricing will be shown to cause the budget share of variety i to be a decreasing function
of i since σ>1. Thus, for a fixed number of active firms, the most efficient firm underestimates its own
market power to a greater extent in this asymmetric model compared to the corresponding
misperception made by the representative firm in the symmetric model. On the other hand, for the
least productive active firm, -σ will be closer to the true demand elasticity than in the symmetric
model.
Optimal export deliveries implies equality between the world price and marginal cost of export
deliveries
(7) ( )P c
s
XW i i
W
=
λ
.
9An industry equilibrium where incentives to enter or exit have been eliminated, requires that
operating profits equals fixed cost for the marginal firm:
(8) π n F= .
In order to derive industry aggregates, we utilise that the solutions for the individual variables of the
same category are related to each other by exponential functions. To see this, substitute (6) into the
domestic product market equilibrium condition (3). By exploiting the exponential structure of
productivity differentials assumed in (2), it can be verified that the domestic market deliveries will
differ between adjacent firms at a constant rate:
(9) X X eiH H
t i
=
−
+
 
0
1
σ
σλ
,
where it can be shown that
(10) X A mc
s
PH0
1
1
=
 




−
−
−
+σ σ ε σλ
.
The structure of domestic prices becomes
(11) P P eiH H
t i
=
+0 1 σλ  ,
where 0
1
<
+
<
t
t
σλ and ( )P mcs XH H0 0= λ  .
The exponential structure of variety prices makes it possible to find a closed form expression for P by
inserting (11) into (4). After integration, one can solve the resulting equation with respect to the
domestic price index P, utilising that −
+
= −
−
<
σ
σλ
t mt
m s1 1
0 :
(12) ( )P A mc
s
m s
t
eN=   −  −








+
−
+
λ
σλ
σ
ελ
1 1
1
1
1
1
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where N nt
m s
= −
−1
.
0 < emN < 1 equals domestic deliveries from the marginal firm relative to those from the most efficient
firm. By combining (2) and (7) deliveries to the export market can also be shown to vary
exponentially between firms with different productivity.
(13) ( )X X eiW W t i= −0 λ ,  
where X sP
c
W
W
0
1
=




λ
.
Thus, export is a decreasing function of i, that is, the lower the productivity, the lower is output. It is
easy to show that maximised operating profits obtained by firm i in the domestic market and the
export market, respectively, becomes:
(14) ( )π iH i iH sm
s
c X= − 1
1
, ( )π iW W iWs P X= −1 .
Despite the separability of variable costs for export and domestic deliveries for an individual firm, the
two markets are connected at the aggregate industry level through the determination of the number of
active firms. Using (14) the entry-exit condition (8) can be written:
(8’) ( ) ( )m
s
c X s P X Fn n
H s W
n
W
−
  + − =1 1
1
.
Using the expressions (9) - (13), (8’) implicitly determines a unique solution for n in terms of
exogenous variables, since total operating profits can be shown to be a monotonically decreasing
function of n.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of the relationship between aggregate
industry productivity and the set of firm specific productivities. We choose the productivity of
variable inputs as our productivity concept. Since factor prices are fixed, this concept can equivalently
be measured by the aggregate variable unit costs defined as
11
(15) C C
X
=
where aggregate industry costs, C, and output, X, is defined as
(16) X X X X di X diH W iHin iWin≡ + = ∫ + ∫= =0 0
(17) ( ) ( )C C C c X di c X diH W i iH sin i iW sin≡ + = ∫ + ∫= =10 10
Alternatively, we could have included the aggregate fixed costs, nF , in our productivity measure. nF
will adjust endogenously due to entry or exit at the aggregate level. As a matter of fact, the subsequent
analysis will provide all information necessary to assess the changes in nF/X. We have two reasons
for disregarding fixed costs. First, the relative importance of these costs is of course strongly
dependent on the size of the exogenous F. The LGMC model presumes all equilibria to have many
firms, which is inconsistent with a large value of F, see (8’). Consequently, the changes in these two
productivity concepts will be approximately the same. Second, we have found the forces determining
the changes in variable productivity to be most interesting from an analytical point of view. Our
choice of productivity concept sharpens the focus on these forces.
3. The links between productivity parameters at the firm level
and aggregate productivity
3.1. Decomposing aggregate productivity
Aggregate industry productivity is a weighted average in two dimensions in our model. First, it
includes an average of productivities related to export and domestic deliveries. This is clearly seen
from the following decomposition of aggregate total average costs
(18) C X
X
C X
X
C
H
H
W
W
=



 +



 ,
where C C Xj j j= , j = H,W is the aggregate variable average costs associated with deliveries to
market j. Second, aggregate industry productivity includes a weighted average of firm specific costs.
We have
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(19) C X
X
C
X
dij i
j
j
n
i
j
i
j=



∫



0 .
We utilise the exponential structure of the equilibrium solutions for prices and deliveries, to express
aggregate deliveries and costs as
(20) ( )X X m s
mt
eH H mN=
−  −0
1 1 .
(21) ( )X X
t
eW W t n= − −0 1λ λ .
(22) ( ) ( )C m st c X eH H s N= −  −1 10 1
(23) ( ) ( )C t c X eW W s t n= − −λ λ0 1 1
The rest of this section is concerned with a close examination of the components of these averages.
3.2. The scope for heterogeneity to make aggregate productivity differ from
productivity in the most efficient firm
It is straightforward to verify that the equilibrium solution for aggregate export productivity takes the
simple form
(24) C sPW W= .
Thus, C W is independent of c and t. The intuition is simple: Each firm equates marginal cost of
export deliveries to the fixed world price PW. For each firm, average variable costs of exports
constitute a fraction s of the corresponding marginal cost, so variable average cost defined over all
firms must equal sPW. Thus, aggregate productivity for deliveries to a market where all firms face the
same exogenous price is unaffected by the degree of heterogeneity in the productivity parameter c
when the scale elasticity is constant and common for all firms. It follows that a pure exporting
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industry will never experience productivity growth at the aggregate level as long as sPW remains
constant.
Aggregate productivity of domestic deliveries is determined in a more complex way. In terms of unit
costs, it can be expressed as
(25) ( ) ( )
( )
C
c X e di
X e di
H
H s s
ti
n
H
t
s
i
n
=
∫
∫
−
+




−
+
0
1 1 1
0
0
1
0
σ
σλ
σ
σλ
 =
−
−



mC
e
e
H
N
mN0
1
1 ( )= −−

mc X
e
e
H
N
mN0
1
1
λ
.
The scope for heterogeneity to cause C H  to deviate from C H0  is seen from (25) to depend on the
term mg(N), where g(N) = (1 - eN)/(1 - emN).
The reason why m turns up in (25) is that m C H0  can be seen to represent the ratio between the
integrals defining CH and XH when the integrals are calculated to infinity instead of n. When n grows
beyond all limits, C H / C H0  is dominated by the ratio between the growth rate of XiH  and the growth
rate of Ci
H wrt. i. The growth rates of Xi
H
 and CiH  wrt. i, equal -σt/(1 + σλ) and t - σt/[s(1 + σλ)],
respectively. Using m = σ/(σ - 1) and λ = 1/s - 1, the fraction between these negative growth rates
equals [-σt/(1 + σλ)]/{t - σt/[s(1 + σλ)] } = m. This transformation underlies the second equality in
(25). Note that the mark-up ratio itself is no primary determinant to C H , but under the price setting
assumptions in the LGMC model, it compactly summarises the effects on C H / C H0  of the equilibrium
adjustments of demand to the price differentials between the differentiated products.
Turning to why g(N) turns up in (25), this factor captures the correction that must be made when the
number of firms is finite compared to the hypothetical limiting case. It is easily seen that g(N)
converges to unity when N increases beyond limits, either because of entry or increased heterogeneity.
Moreover, this function g(N) is strictly increasing and concave with and ( )limN g N→∞ ′ = 0 , so the
convergence is from below. Using L’Hopital’s rule it can be shown that ( )limN g N m→ =0 1 , which
confirms the obvious intuitive result that C H  and C H0  coincides if firm no. 0 is the only active firm.
We also have ( )limN g N→ ′ = ∞0  indicating that g(N) converges relatively fast towards the asymptotic
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value 1 when n increases from 0 into the range where the LGMC model is an appropriate model of
market behaviour.
We are now able to draw a surprisingly sharp and general conclusion about the scope for
heterogeneity to cause C H  to deviate from C H0 , i.e. to create aggregate scale diseconomies through
entry and exit. It follows from (25) and the properties of the g(N) function that C H  is bound to lie
within the interval
(26) C C mCH H H0 0< < .
The relative width of this interval is given by m = σ/(σ - 1) > 0, which is smaller the higher is the
substitutability among the differentiated products. This result was also shown in Holmøy (1997) in a
model with more restrictive assumptions. Note that if the LGMC is an appropriate model, the range of
variation will be very narrow for two reasons. First, the model supposes that the products are
imperfect but close substitutes, which implies that m is relatively close to unity. Second, sticking to
the price setting behaviour as in the LGMC model for all firms, we have implicitly assumed that even
the largest firm, i.e. no. 0, has an insignificant market share. Then N is large, and the extremely
concave shape of g(N) implies that variations in N takes place within a range in the interval where
g’(N) is close to 0. Consequently, the LGMC model of the domestic market contains endogenous
mechanisms which causes the productivity in the most efficient firm to be a very good predictor of the
average productivity of output delivered to this market. Neither the degree of heterogeneity between
adjacent firms, measured by t, nor the absolute gap between the most efficient and the infinitely
inefficient firm will affect the relative width of the interval in this model. It is also independent of the
scale elasticity of the individual production functions (provided of course non-increasing returns to
scale in variable inputs).
The provocative part of (26) is of course the existence of the upper asymptote for C H  despite the fact
that the entering firms becomes successively less efficient when n increases beyond limits. The
principal reason for this result is that the equilibrium level CiH  is not increasing, but decreasing in i.
This is indeed a condition for the integral defining CH to converge when n approaches infinity.
Formally, this is easily seen from inspection of the growth rate for Ci
H
 wrt. i, which equals
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t - σt/[s(1 + σλ)] = mt/(1 - m/s) < 0. The intuitive explanation is that the negative demand response to
an upward shift in the marginal cost curve is strong enough to reduce total variable costs of domestic
deliveries.
When firm technologies exhibit constant returns to scale, i.e. λ = 0 and C H0 = c,  then not only the
range of potential variation in C H / C H0  is limited. We can also conclude that  the range of potential
variation in the absolute level of C H  is limited.
It follows that the existence of and variation in heterogeneity, will have a very little influence on the
determination of the aggregate productivity level, unless C H0  is affected. Such an impact is
proportional to λ, for a given impact on XH0 . From (9)-(11) we find that XH0  is related to exogenous
variables and n by
(27) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
X A mc
s
m s
t
eH N0
1 1 11 1=  
−  −








−
− − −
+
ε σ ε σ
ελ
.
The degree of heterogeneity, measured by t, influences ( )X P P APH H0 0= − −σ ε  through the price index
P. P is proportional to the term in the square brackets in (27) raised by -1/(σ -1). For a fixed n, a rise
in t will have a positive effect on each price in terms of PH0 . This will reduce P PH0 . A closer study
of how C H0  will change due to equilibrium adjustments of XH0  is one of the tasks carried out in the
next two sections.
3.3. Approximate results in the case where the marginal firm is negligible
In order to clarify the mechanisms that turn out to be the strongest determinants of C , we will in this
section first consider approximate solutions where the effects working through N are neglected. In
section 3.4, we return to an interpretation and assessment of the deviations between the approximate
solutions and the true ones.
From the formal expressions for the terms in (18), it is clear that the degree of inaccuracy caused by
this simplifying approximation is small when N is large. Since N = nt/(1 - m/s) < 0, setting eN = 0 is a
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tolerable approximation when we restrict the analysis to the case where the marginal firm is of
negligible size relative to the industry as a whole in terms of output and costs. We will therefore refer
to this case as the «Negligible Marginal Firm» (NMF) case. This case is relevant when there is a large
number of firms, which has already been assumed. In section 3.4 we formally show the intuitive result
that n is a decreasing function of F. Thus, the smaller the entry barrier, the more relevant is the NMF
case and the LGMC model. The accuracy of the NMF case is also larger the more asymmetric is the
equilibrium. More asymmetry is created by increasing t, which makes a firm i > 0 smaller relative to
the most efficient one.
The inaccuracies introduced when moving from the true solution to the NMF approximation, are of
two distinct kinds. First, since the marginal firm is insignificant wrt. output and costs relative to the
industry as a whole, the deliveries and costs in the unprofitable inactive firms will be even less
significant. Consequently, we overestimate, cet. par., aggregate deliveries and costs, but to a
negligible extent, when contributions from these firms are included when adding over firms.
Equivalently, but more formally, there will be a negligible difference between the finite and the
infinite integrals required to find aggregate productivity.
The second kind of inaccuracy turns up in the price index P. This price index also involves a finite
integral of product prices, which is replaced by an infinite integral in the NMF approximation. The
effect is that the negative love-of variety effect on P is maximised for a given t. Thus, when we use
the NMF approximation to study shifts in c and t, we disregard changes in the strength of this effect.
We will explain in more detail in section 3.4 that the underestimation of P in the NMF case
contributes to a negative bias in the determination of the relative size of the most efficient firm.
It is obvious from (24) that the aggregate productivity of exports is unaffected by the NMF
approximation. Aggregate export deliveries will be biased upwards in the NMF solution because
exports from non-active firms are included whereas P is irrelevant. For C H  and XH the two kinds of
biases have opposite sign, so neglecting both improves the accuracy of the NMF approximation
compared to neglecting only one of them.
Note that the when λ = 0, the approximate NMF solution for C H , denoted by C H
NMF
, will
unambiguously overestimate the true solution. In this case the approximate solution will be equal to
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the upper limit of the interval restricting the true solution, i.e. C mcH
NMF
= . There is no modifying
cost effect from the negative bias in XH0 .
Accepting the NMF approximation , it is clear that aggregate productivity of domestic deliveries can
be studied by analysing the productivity of the most efficient firm5. In the NMF case the following
closed form solution for this equilibrium productivity can be derived from (25) and (27):
(28)
( ) ( ) ( )
C c A mc
s
m s
t
H
NMF0
1 11
=
  − 






− − − −
+ε σ ε σ λ ελ
.
From (28) we get the elasticities in the NMF case:
(29) 0 < Elc H NMFC0
1
1
1  = + ≤ελ ,
(30) El Elt H NMF c
H
NMF
C C0 01 1 1
  = −
−
  +
  =
−
−
   
σ ε
σ
λ
ελ λ
σ ε
σ
> 0.
The intuition behind (29) can be acquired through the following argument. If XH0 were constant,
raising c by 1 percent contributes directly to a 1 percent increase in C H0 . However, if there are strictly
decreasing returns to scale (λ > 0), the equilibrium adjustment of XH0  implies a negative modification
of C H0  . The reason is that the marginal cost functions of all firms will shift upwards by 1 percent. As
long as domestic deliveries from the infinite mass of firms are fixed, P will increase by 1 percent,
causing a drop in demand equal to ε percent. As long as t is constant, the relative distribution of the
domestic deliveries will remain constant, so that the decline in aggregate demand is met by the same
relative reduction in the delivery supplied by each firm. When λ > 0, this delivery adjustment reduces
                                                     
5
 As a matter of fact, the NMF assumption of an infinite number of firms makes the model work in exactly the same way with
respect to shifts in c as a partial equilibrium model where the supply side consists of one single firm facing a demand
function of the form X AP= −ε . In such a model optimal producer behaviour would imply price setting according to
( )P mc s X= λ . It is straightforward to verify that average cost in equilibrium becomes [ ]C bc= +1 1 ελ , where b is a
positive constant.
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marginal costs in all firms. This will be carried forward to domestic prices and P. In equilibrium the
contribution from the adjustment of XH0 on C H0  equals -ελ/(1 + ελ) percent. Adding the 1 percent
direct shift in the cost function yields (29).
The increase in C H0  caused by increasing t, is generated by a different mechanism. In this case the
most efficient firm is the only firm that does not experience a shift in its cost function. A positive
impact on C H0  therefore requires strictly decreasing returns to scale combined with an increase in
XH0 . This is caused by the dominance of what we will refer to as an internal substitution effect. More
precisely, the shift in marginal domestic costs implied by increasing t makes all but product 0 more
expensive for domestic consumers. They will redirect their demand towards product 0. This internal
substitution effect is proportional to the rise in P PH0 , which in the NMF case equals
( )[ ] ( )m s t− −1 1 1σ , so the term 1/(σ -1) in (30) is the elasticity of P PH0  wrt. t. If total domestic
demand towards the industry were constant, a one percent increase in P PH0  would cause a relative
expansion of XH0  equal to σ/(σ -1). However, this internal substitution effect is modified by the
reduction in aggregate domestic demand through what we may refer to as an external substitution
effect. The net effect equals (σ - ε)/(σ -1), which is positive since the varieties within the industry are
closer substitutes to each other than to products classified in another industry. The modification
introduced through the term λ/(1 + ελ) is due to the marginal cost effect of adjusting XH0 .
The last equality in (30) establishes the relationship between aggregate domestic productivity effects
from c and t. Productivity improvements induced by catching up instead of uniform shifts in c, depend
critically on the dominance of the internal over the external substitution effect, and on diseconomies
of scale within each firm. In the special case of NMF combined with constant returns to scale at the
firm level, it is impossible to improve aggregate domestic productivity through catching up; reducing
c is the only potent source. Again, this result is generated by the endogenous equilibrium adjustment
of the domestic deliveries at the micro level, which constitute the relevant weights when calculating
average domestic productivity.
We now turn to a closer examination of the changes in the output shares in (18). It follows from (9),
(10) and (13) that, in the NMF case, aggregate deliveries can be written
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From (31) and (32) we find the NMF-case elasticities of aggregate deliveries:
(33) Elc W NMFX
  = − 1λ
(34) Elt W NMFX
  = −1
(35) 0 > Elc H NMFX
  = − + > −
ε
ελ λ1
1
(36) Elt H NMFX
  = − + −
−
  +
  > −1 1
1
1
1σ ε
σ ελ
A comparison of (33) and (35) shows that reductions in c will increase aggregate export deliveries
relatively more than aggregate domestic deliveries. A similar result holds when t is changed. This
implies that aggregate productivity may be inversely related to shifts in the productivity parameters.
This possibility can also be seen directly from (18). For example, in the case of export productivity
being lower than productivity of domestic deliveries, aggregate productivity will decline if shifts in c
and t cause a sufficiently strong increase in the export share of total output. The possibility and
strength of such an effect have nothing to do with productivity heterogeneity among firms. Such a
“weighing effect” will exist even if the industry consists of firms with identical technology, or a
representative firm. However, the magnitude of the adjustments of productivity components and
weights entering (18) are, in different degrees, affected by the existence of productivity differentials.
We have calibrated a numerical version of the model to real data for manufacturing of chemical and
mineral products in Norway in 1992.  The computations displayed in Figure 1 illustrate the possibility
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of an inverse relationship between the productivity parameters and aggregate productivity
performance, and show how large the shifts in c must be to bring about such an inverse relationship
when parameters and variables have reasonable initial values. The figure shows the effects on
aggregate average variable costs, of 50 reductions, each by 1 percent, in c. For smaller reductions in c,
average costs for the industry as a whole decreases (industry productivity increases). But as c is
reduced beyond a critical level, industry productivity growth is diminished, and eventually even
reversed, due to the weighing effect. Average variable costs of exports are independent of c and t,
whereas average variable costs of domestic deliveries decline steadily. Export deliveries increase
faster than domestic deliveries, see Figure 2, causing the weights in the average industry costs to shift
in favour of exports for which productivity remains constant. Eventually, this weighing effect
outweighs the increased productivity of domestic deliveries. Simulations of changes in t reveal a
similar pattern.
Figure 1. Aggregate average costs
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Figure 2. Aggregate output (billions NOK)
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To summarise the analysis of the NMF case, we have found that in both markets there is a fixed
relationship between aggregate productivity and the productivity of the most efficient firm. This
relationship is independent of both the degree of productivity heterogeneity and the scale elasticity.
We have also seen that shifts in c and t have fundamentally different effects on aggregate productivity
in the domestic market. Shifts in t have no effects on aggregate productivity if there are constant
returns to scale. Compared to the effects of shifts in c, the magnitude of the effects of t depends
critically on the strength of the internal substitution effect. Aggregate export deliveries are more
sensitive to shifts in c and t than domestic deliveries. Combined with the effects of market structure
on productivity in the different markets, this implies that aggregate productivity may be inversely
related to the productivity parameters at the level of the firm, if ε is sufficiently low. Productivity
heterogeneity is not necessary for such a possibility to exist, but it generally affects the strength of the
effect.
3.4. A closer examination of the bias of the approximate results
In this section we examine in more detail how the results of the NMF case will be modified when the
marginal firm contributes significantly to the determination of the industry aggregates. For C H , it is
clear from (26) that the relevance of such an examination is increasing in m (and thus decreasing in
σ).
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Determination of the number of firms
We start by analysing how changes in c and t will affect the equilibrium number of active firms. Since
the fixed cost requirement is the same for all firms, variable profits of the new marginal firm will
equal variable profits of the old one. We use the labels «old» and «new» marginal firm to distinguish
the marginal firm ex ante changes in n (old) from the marginal firm ex post changes in n (new). These
labels should of course not be treated too literally since n is treated as a continuous variable. Since the
single entry decision implies deliveries to both the export and the domestic market simultaneously, the
entry incentive is a weighted average of the market specific entry incentives, being i) profits earned on
exports and ii) profits from domestic sales. This was formalised in (8’) where n is a function of c and
t.
Logarithmic differentiation of (8’) wrt. c yields the total equilibrium elasticity of n wrt. c
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The denominator Z measures the relative impact on operating profits earned by the marginal firm of a
partial increase in n. For stability in the Marshallian sense, this impact should be negative. −nt λ
captures the relative difference in operating profits earned from exports between the old and the new
marginal firm. It is negative because the new firm exports at a lower scale to compensate for its lower
productivity. Since N < 0, and −nt λ < 0, a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for Marshallian
stability is that the term in square brackets is positive. This condition is met because 1/(1 - e-N) < 0
and σ > ε . The bracketed term captures the relative difference in variable costs related to domestic
deliveries between the old and the new marginal firm. Recall that there is a fixed proportion between
domestic profits and variable costs of domestic deliveries. N is the relative impact on CnH of
increasing n when XH0  is fixed. It is negative because the marginal firm experiences decreasing
domestic output, which dominates the positive profit effect from higher marginal costs. The other
expression in the square brackets captures the cost effect due to equilibrium adjustments in XH0 .
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The partial elasticity wrt. c of profits earned in the domestic market shows up in (37) as the term
( )[ ]1 1− +ε ελs . Since we always have ( )[ ] ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1≥ − + = − + > −ε ελ ε λε λs , the relative
impact of c will always be less negative on profits earned abroad than on profits earned in the
domestic market. In fact, the sign of the partial elasticity of domestic profits wrt. c is ambiguous. It is
decreasing from 1 as ε increases from 0. It passes 0 when ε=1, and approaches 1/(1-m/s)>-1/λ as ε
approaches σ. The intuitive explanation is straightforward: A one percent partial increase in c will be
carried forward by the price setting producers to a 1 percent rise in the prices of all pre-existing
products and thereby the price index P. This will reduce domestic demand by more than one percent
when ε > 1. Thus, sales income and profits for the old marginal firm go down by the same proportion.
When ε <1, the old marginal firm will experience higher income and profits from sales in the
domestic market. Thus, due to the presence of profits from exports, there exists a critical value ε*<1,
depending negatively on the export share for the marginal firm, for which the number of firms will be
insensitive to a change in c. If ε less (greater) than ε*, reductions in c will reduce (increase) total
operating profits in the old marginal firm and firms will exit (enter) the industry.
Figure 3. Profits from exports and domestic delivieries in the marginal firm
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The numerator in (37) is a weighted sum of the relative impact of c on profits in the old marginal firm
earned on the domestic and the export market respectively. For the old marginal firm the partial
elasticity of profits from exports wrt. c will be equal to the elasticity of exports, which equals
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-1/λ < 0. Figure 3 shows how profits from exports and domestic deliveries in the marginal firm
respond to changes in c in the numerical simulations.
(37) includes of course only first order effects on n. Since the determinants of Elcn in (37) include
endogenous variables, the relationship between c and n will in general not be log-linear. We just
showed that the relative impact of c will always be less negative on export profits than on domestic
profits. Moreover, the relationship between c and n may be non-monotonic when one takes into
account that ε may be endogenous. This is the case in the numerical version of our model, where the
demand for the differentiated product is modelled as a two step separable budgeting process.
Formally, we have ( )P P Q− −=ε δ , where Q is a linearly homogenous price function of P and the
price indexes for composites supplied by other industries and imports. δ is the elasticity of
substitution between the differentiated industry product and other composite goods. The own price
elasticity of the composite differentiated product then becomes ( )ε θ δ= −1 , where the budget share of
the composite industry good in total domestic expenditure, θ, will vary when δ ≠ 1 . This effect causes
ε to decline with productivity growth when δ > 1, which is the case in our numerical simulations,
where we also have ε > 1 at the initial values for the productivity parameters. Thus, it is possible to
shift c in such a way that they induce entry within a limited range and exit when c generates a model
solution where ε < ε*. In the numerical simulations there is a positive monotonic relationship between
c and n in the productivity spectre that has explored. The basic determinant of this result is the
endogeneity of the profit shares. The share of total operating profits earned from exports will increase
as productivity improves. Therefore, although the entry incentive from the domestic market
diminishes and eventually becomes negative, this effect is more than outweighed by the increasingly
strong positive entry incentive from the export market.
The total equilibrium elasticity of n wrt. t, Eltn, is found from (8’):
(38)    
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The reason why Eltn >-1 can be explained by showing why Eltn = -1 is inconsistent with equilibrium.
If Eltn = -1, N = nt/(emN - 1) and ( ) ( )π λ λnW W W nts P sP c e= − −1 1  would have been unchanged.
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However ( ) ( )π nH H s Nm s c X e= −1 0 1  will increase because XH0  is increasing in t, see (31) and (36). In
other words, a 1 percent reduction of n as a response to a 1 percent increase in t would imply that the
new marginal firm earned more profits in the domestic market and the same profits in the export
market, compared to the old marginal firm. Consequently, profits in the new marginal firm would
exceed F. Therefore the equilibrium multiplier of n wrt. t will be smaller than unity, and this
modification is proportional to initial profits from the domestic market.
How changes in n modifies the solutions of the NMF case
Having examined how and why n will adjust to reductions in c and t, we proceed with a closer study
of how changes in n influence the average aggregate productivity. As pointed out in the previous
section, we should keep in mind that this influence should represent a relatively minor modification
compared to the solution of the NMF case. Recall that the modifications will not apply to C W , but to
C H , XH and XW  in (18). Moreover, it should be noted that C H and XH are modified by n through
N, and that N depends symmetrically on n and t. The subsequent discussion of the impact of changes
in n, will consequently also apply to the impact on N of changing t, which was also neglected in the
NMF case. Above, we found that the equilibrium number of active firms could adjust in both
directions as response to changes in c and t. However, we will confine the discussion to the case
where n increases when c or t is reduced.
According to (25) and (27) the modifications due to changes in n can be decomposed into changes in
the multiplier 0 < g(N)=(1 - eN)/(1 - emN) < 1, and changes in C H0  due to modifications in XH0
through the term (1 - eN). Recall that N = nt/(1 - m/s) < 0, implying a unique correspondence between
relative changes in n (and t) and N. Since we have found that g(N) is monotonically increasing in n
between the limit values 1/m and 1, an increase in n implies that the true solution of C H  will move
upwards within the interval [C mCH H0 0, , i.e. in the direction of the of the approximate solution of the
NMF case.
The range of the interval containing the true solution of C H is fixed by m, but the position of the
whole interval will move because of changes in C H0 . An increase in n or t will increase (1 - eN),
which reduces XH0 and C H0  when λ > 0. The intuition behind this effect is that (1 - eN) is the
correction of P relative to the NMF solution. When n increases P is reduced because of the «love of
26
variety» property of the utility function. This induces both the internal and external substitution away
from product 0 as discussed in the previous section. The «love of variety» effect is well known in the
symmetric LGMC model. It is somewhat modified in our asymmetric model because prices charged
by entrants will be successively higher, due to their successively lower productivity. But although the
price index includes higher prices as n grows, the valuation of increased variety still causes P to
decline in n.
Consequently, the net effect on C H  of taking into account that the marginal firm may be significant,
is ambiguous. On the one hand, the true change in C H becomes more accurately approximated by the
elasticity calculated for the NMF case. Since the solution of the NMF case for C CH H0 includes a
positive bias, this modification implies that C CH H0 is not reduced as much as found in the NMF
case when c and t declines. On the other hand, the NMF solution underestimates the reduction in C H0 ,
which implies a modification in the opposite direction on C H . The fact that the two modifications of
the NMF solution counteract each other, strengthens the argument for the NMF case being a good
approximation of the true solution.
The ambiguity of the elasticity of C H wrt. n can be seen explicitly by the formal elasticity expression.
From (25) one obtains
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where ( )[ ] ( )d m≡ + − +1 1 1λ ε ελ  < 1 since ε < σ and λ > 0. The properties of the function g(N)
implies that the term in the square bracket is negative if d were equal to unity. However, since d < 1,
the sign of the bracketed term in (39) is ambiguous. d captures the negative scale effect on variable
unit costs within the pre-existing firms due to the redistribution of demand from pre-existing to less
productive entrants6.
                                                     
6
 The empirical magnitude of the difference between d and unity is modest in our numerical simulations. Here ε is well above
unity while s= .8. Since d(1)=s, and d’(ε)>0, it follows that d is close to unity in these simulations. Accordingly, the sign of
the term inside the brackets in (37) will then still negative. Since N<0, it follows that the partial elasticity of aggregate
variable cost per unit of domestic deliveries with respect to n is positive
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It follows that if the technology of each firm exhibits constant returns to scale, expanding domestic
deliveries from the industry through entry of firms implies decreasing returns to scale at the aggregate
industry level. The main reason for this is the ranking of firms according to diminishing productivity.
However, this conclusion may be reversed if there is a strong degree of decreasing returns to scale
within each firm. The positive contribution to aggregate productivity from redistributing the most
costly units of supplies from the pre-existing firms to the entrants, may be large enough to dominate
the negative contribution implied by the lower efficiency of these entrants.
From (21) it follows that the relative change in aggregate exports is modified compared to the NMF
case by the term ( ) ( )[ ]( )nt e t nntλ λ − +1     , where    t n and denote the relative changes in t and n. Still
considering the case where n increases when c declines, the true equilibrium elasticity of aggregate
exports wrt. c is then seen to be greater than in the NMF case. This is consistent with the claim that
the NMF case represents an overestimation of the true equilibrium level for aggregate exports which
is decreasing in n and t. Turning to shifts in t,  t and Eltn have opposite sign, but from (38) it follows
that  t nt+ <El 0 . Therefore, the true elasticity of aggregate exports wrt. t is somewhat overestimated
in the NMF case.
Whether the true solution for XH is greater or smaller than in the NMF case is ambiguous for the same
reasons as those causing the ambiguity of modification of C H . Taking into account that eN > 0, rather
than 0, (20) implies a smaller value for XH , given XH0 , since the NMF solution includes deliveries
from the non-active firms. However, inspection of (20) reveals that the true solution for XH0  is larger
than the corresponding solution in the NMF case. As mentioned, the reason is that is that the price
index P is underestimated in the NMF case where the presence of infinitely many products maximises
the love-of-variety effect.
Formally, the net ambiguous impact of N on XH is captured by the term (1 - emN)/(1 - eN)(σ - ε)/[(σ - 1)(1 + ελ)].
We then have
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which is clearly analogous to (39). Since mNemN/(emN -1) < NeN/(eN -1), this elasticity is surely
negative if (σ - ε)/[(σ - 1)(1 + ελ)] > 1, or equivalently if ε < 1/[1 + λ(σ - 1)], that is, if the external
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substitution effect is sufficiently weak. In the special case where ε = 1 and λ = 0, the influence on XH
of N degenerates to (1 - emN)/(1 - eN) > 1, which implies that the true solution of XH is larger than the
solution obtained in the NMF case. However, when ε = 1 and λ = 0, the ratio of the NMF solution to
the true solution of XH will exceed 1/m, which is the minimum limit of the ratio when N approaches 0
from above. For a fixed ε, (1 - emN)/(1 - eN)(σ - ε)/[(σ - 1)(1 + ελ)] is increasing in λ > 0, which implies that the
degree of underestimation is reduced, and for a sufficiently high λ the NMF solution will overestimate
the true value of XH . The same change in impact will take place when ε increases from 0. When ε = 0,
(1 - emN)/(1 - eN)(σ - ε)/[(σ - 1)(1 + ελ)] = (1 - emN)/(1 - eN)m > 1 representing the minimum values of this
function wrt. to ε. (This minimum value is in turn increasing in both N and m.)
Finally, we consider the modifications through changes in N in the case where t is reduced. From (38)
we know that  t nt+ <El 0 , making N less negative. Consequently, accounting for changes in N, will
modify the true equilibrium solution of XH in opposite directions when we compare the equilibrium
adjustments to shifts in c and t as long as we assume Elcn > 0. A less negative value of N implies that
reductions in t inevitably makes the NMF case a less accurate approximation. Still, it can not be
decided theoretically whether the impact of t on the true solution of XH will be smaller or greater than
the adjustments calculated for the NMF case, where XH could change in both directions. However, if
the external substitution effect is sufficiently weak to make the NMF elasticity of XH wrt. t positive,
cf. (36), we have shown that then ElnXH = ElNXH < 0. Since the equilibrium value of N is increasing
in t, the relative change in N will be positive when t is increased. Therefore, the modifications due to
changes in N will reduce the true elasticity of XH wrt. t compared to the corresponding NMF elasticity.
To summarise, the inaccuracy of the NMF case compared to the true solution is due to the fact that the
NMF case implicitly includes deliveries and prices of infinitely many non-active firms. The inclusion
of deliveries of non-active firms contributes to bias the NMF solution of C H , X H and XW  upwards.
The inclusion of prices of non-active firms biases P downwards to the level where the «love-of-
variety» effect is maximised in all equilibria. This in turn contributes to negative biases on
C H and X H , through underestimation of C H0  and X H0 . The fact that the NMF modifications case
work in opposite directions, strengthens the argument that the NMF solution is a reasonable
approximation to the true solution.
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4. Concluding remarks
The analysis presented in this paper has shown that endogenous equilibrium adjustments are of
crucial importance to the aggregate productivity effects of firm specific productivity shifts. These
adjustments are particularly important for the quantity weights used in the determination of aggregate
productivity. The analysis has confirmed the view that it may be problematic to interpret changes in
aggregate productivity as an indicator of technological change, since the link between technological
shocks and aggregate productivity is heavily influenced by market structure and equilibrium
adjustments.
By incorporating equilibrium adjustments through simultaneous interactions between supply and
demand incentives, our analysis represents an extension compared to the works of
Johansen(1959,1972) and Houthakker (1955-56). When determinants of aggregate productivity
depend on the outcome of market equilibria, it will in general depend on the organisation and
competitive structure in the relevant markets. Our analysis has demonstrated this dependence by
considering two kinds of market structure, one perfectly competitive «export» market where the
product price is fixed exogenously, and one monopolistically competitive «domestic» market.
The most interesting and counterintuitive results were obtained in the case of monopolistic
competition. Here, the equilibrating forces determining the firm specific contributions to aggregate
productivity, cause the relative weights of successively less productive firms to decline faster than
their productivity level. Our analysis shows that aggregate productivity of deliveries to this market
will be less than, but very close to the product of the mark-up factor and the productivity of the most
efficient firm. Thus productivity heterogeneity will not contribute significantly to decreasing returns
to scale at the industry level. When products are close substitutes, as assumed in the LGMC model,
this implies that the equilibrium gap between aggregate productivity and the productivity of the most
efficient firm will be modest.
The equilibrium outcome for the aggregate productivity related to domestic deliveries will have
qualitative similarities to the outcome of the much more transparent process determining the
equilibrium level of productivity for export deliveries. In the export market, all firms will equal their
marginal costs to the fixed world price. This generates a common equilibrium productivity level in
each firm, which is independent of firm specific productivity parameters. However, we have shown
that the underlying mechanisms generating these results are very different.
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Our framework makes it possible to study firm specific as well as uniform technology shifts. We have
demonstrated that the aggregate productivity effect of uniform productivity shifts is fundamentally
different from the one caused by reduction of the productivity differentials through catching up. An
important by-product of our study is that we demonstrate how it is possible to incorporate
heterogeneity into the standard LGMC model at a low cost in terms of analytical tractability.
Some qualifications should be made explicit. First, although the equilibrium quantities used as
weights in aggregate productivity measures are determined in a widely accepted modelling
framework, one may question if the results rely on too price sensitive demand responses. Numerical
experiments suggest that it is difficult to reproduce consistency between observed size distributions of
firms within industries, productivity differentials between them and an elasticity of substitution
calibrated to estimated mark-up factors. This suggests that it may be fruitful to study the effects of
heterogeneity and productivity shifts under other assumptions of market structure.
Second, our model relies on some restrictive assumptions with respect to the structure of productivity
differentials. Especially, the exponential structure made it possible to summarise the aggregate
industry structure by a small number of parameters. This would not be possible if the relative
productivity differentials varied significantly when moving from the most efficient to successively
less efficient firms. However, most of our local comparative statics results would probably hold.
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Appendix A
Deriving the additively separable cost function from a separable
production function
The firm technology is a special case of the general production function
(A1) ( )F X X VW H, , = 0 ,
where V is s variable input. In this appendix we specify the restrictions, which imply that the variable
cost function can be separated additively as in (1). The first restriction is that input is additively
separable from an aggregate of outputs:
(A2) ( )G X X VW H, = .
The second restriction is that the G(.) function takes the symmetric form
(A3) ( ) ( ) ( )G X X X XW H W H, = + ρ ρ
µ
,
which is a homothetic transformation function. The elasticity of transformation, σW is given by
( )σ ρW = −1 1 >0. The third and final restriction is that µ =1. The technology can then be written
(A4) ( ) ( )X X VW Hρ ρ+ = .
In order to establish the connection to the cost function in (1), define a variable s instead of µ so that
s sρµ ρ= =1. (A4) can then be written
(A5) ( ) ( )X X VW H sρ ρ ρ+  =
1
,
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where the left hand side is a linearly homogenous transformation function with constant elasticity of
transformation, σW. This is the CET function motivated and discussed in Devarajan, Lewis and
Robinson (1990). It is natural to interpret this CET function of export and domestic deliveries as an
aggregation function for output, X. (A5) then becomes
(A6a) ( ) ( )X X XW H= + ρ ρ
ρ1
(A6b) X Vs= ,
where s now has the interpretation as the elasticity of scale in the production function transforming
(aggregate) input into aggregate output. The cost function dual to this technology is of course
(A7) C qV qX s* = = 1 ,
where q is the factor price of V.
(A8) ( ) ( )C q X XW H s* = + ρ ρ
ρ1
.
Since sρ =1, the exponent in (A8) vanishes. Redefining units in which V is measured enables us to
write (A8) as
(A9) ( ) ( )C c X XW s H s* = + 1 1 ,
which is the variable part of the cost function (1).
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